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Abstract. The practical homodyne detector model of continuous-variable quantum
key distribution models the inherent imperfections of the practical homodyne detector,
namely the limited detection efficiency and the electronic noise, into trusted loss.
However, the conventional practical homodyne detector model is valid only when
both the imperfections of the practical homodyne detector are calibrated. In this
paper, we show a modified practical homodyne detector model that can model
the imperfections separately. The phase-sensitive amplifier is further applied to
compensate the imperfections of the practical homodyne detector. The feasibility
of the modified practical homodyne detector model with the phase-sensitive amplifier
is proved and the security analysis is provided in detail. Simulation results reveal that
the phase-sensitive amplifier can be used to improve the performance of the modified
practical homodyne detector model, and when the gain is infinitely high, the limited
detection efficiency can be fully compensated.
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2] which aims at establishing secure key distribution
process is one of the most practical applications in the field of quantum information
science. Continuous variable (CV) QKD [3, 4] which is developed slightly posterior to
discrete variable QKD, is now going through a booming period. Many kinds of CV-
QKD protocols with specific purposes are proposed and analyzed: measurement-device-
independent CV-QKD protocols can defense arbitrary attacks against the detector [5–7],
while source-device-independent CV-QKD protocols are intrinsically secure against the
malicious source [8, 9]. Discrete modulation CV-QKD protocols can effectively reduce
the modulation complexity [10–12], and passive state preparation CV-QKD protocols
use the thermal source to generate quantum states which can reduce the difficulty of
the state preparation [13, 14]. Studies have also been extended to the attack scheme
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of the eavesdropper Eve [15] and the future QKD network model [16]. The coherent
states and homodyne detection CV-QKD (GG02) [17,18] protocol is currently the most
applicable protocol in practical implementations. It can apply off-the-shelf components
to prepare coherent states and detect coherent states with the high bandwidth homodyne
detector. Experimental demonstration of over 200km of transmission distance under the
laboratory conditions has been reported [19]. The practical field test has reached 50km
which proves the applicability of the coherent states and homodyne detection CV-QKD
protocol in a metropolitan distance [20].
The practical implementations of the CV-QKD protocols will inevitably encounter
the gap between the theoretical entanglement-based (EB) model and the practical
prepare-and-measure (PM) model. The practical implementations suffer from different
kinds of imperfections of the actual devices. These imperfections may threat the
practical security of the CV-QKD system and degrade the secret key rate [2]. Previously,
the security analysis assumes any loss and noise are attributed to the eavesdropping
in the quantum channel, which results in a very low secret key rate. Great efforts
have been dedicated to fulfil this gap, and currently the most applied approach is to
characterize the practical devices so that the imperfections can be properly modelled
in the theoretical EB model [21]. Since the devices are normally within the control of
the trusted parties, by carefully characterizing and calibrating the devices, we are able
to model the imperfections as trusted noise and loss in the EB model. In this way,
the negative impacts of the imperfections can be mitigated compared to the previous
analysis that treats the imperfections as untrusted channel loss. Many studies have
been conducted to characterize the imperfections of the practical devices and model
these imperfections in the EB model. For the sender Alice, noise introduced during the
practical state preparation has been studied [22–25], the corresponding monitor scheme
is also proposed [26]. For the receiver Bob, the major imperfections of the practical
homodyne detector are the limited detection efficiency and the electronic noise, which
have been analyzed and modelled as trusted detection noise and trusted detection loss
in the EB model [21, 27].
However, the conventional practical homodyne detector model works only when
both the detection efficiency and the electronic noise are calibrated. It means that even
though the detection efficiency is calibrated, it still cannot be treated as trusted loss if the
electronic noise is not properly calibrated. In this paper, we show a modified practical
homodyne detector model that models the detection efficiency and the electronic noise
separately. This model exhibits great importance because it allows any calibrated
imperfections to be modelled as trusted loss, which makes the practical homodyne
detector model more flexible. The relation between the modified practical homodyne
detector model and the conventional practical homodyne detector model is studied
in detail, while we show that the modified practical homodyne detector model can
describe the practical PM model. The one-time-calibration method [28] can be viewed
as a particular instance that directly benefits from the modified practical homodyne
detector model. We further improve the modified practical homodyne detector model
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by applying the phase-sensitive amplifier (PSA). Several studies has suggested that
the conventional practical homodyne detector model can be improved by the PSA
in different scenarios [29–32]. Subsequently, it is natural for us to wonder whether
such an amplifier can be used in the modified practical homodyne detector model. We
thoroughly analysis the possibility of applying the PSA to increase the secret key rate
of the CV-QKD protocol that is based on the modified practical homodyne detector
model. The feasibility and detailed secret key rate analysis are provided, numerous
simulation results are demonstrated to show the effect of the PSA.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, the modified practical
homodyne detector model is introduced, and the relation with the conventional practical
homodyne detector model is addressed. In section 3, the PSA is applied to the modified
practical homodyne detector model. We prove the feasibility and provide detailed
secret key rate analysis. Numerous simulation results are shown in section 4 where
the performance of the modified practical homodyne detector model with the assistance
of the PSA is analyzied. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2. The modified practical homodyne detector model
In this section, the modified practical homodyne detector model is introduced right
after a short review on the conventional practical homodyne detector model. By
exploiting the relation of the electronic noise between them, we prove that the two
practical homodyne detector models are essentially the same, when the raw data from
the practical realization is normalized by the same shot-noise unit (SNU). Lastly, we
discuss how to model single imperfection of the practical homodyne detector individually
by applying the modified practical homodyne detector model. We restrict ourselves to
the coherent states and homodyne detection scheme, where the receiver Bob randomly
measures x or p quadrature of the signal. Two major imperfections of a practical
homodyne detector are considered: the limited detection efficiency and the electronic
noise.
The PM model is normally applied in the practical implementations, while the EB
model is used to perform security analysis and secret key rate calculation. The security
relies on the equivalence between the PM model and the EB model. Yet, the raw data
obtained from the PM model cannot be taken into the corresponding EB model directly.
It has to be normalized by the SNU first. More precisely, the output variance of the PM
model after the SNU normalization should equal to that of the EB model, so that the
equivalence can hold. The EB model of the conventional practical homodyne detector
model is depicted in figure 1(a), the limited detection efficiency ηd is modelled by the
transmittance of the beamsplitter (BS) while the electronic noise is modelled by an
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) state whose one mode is injected to the other port of
the BS, the introduced noise variance in mode N is set as the electronic noise vel. It
can be easily calculated that the variance of the output from this EB model is
V EBN = ηdVM + (1− ηd) + vel, (1)
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Figure 1. Three ways of modelling the practical homodyne detector. (a) The
conventional practical homodyne detector model. The limited detection efficiency is
imitated by the transmittance of the BS, while an EPR state is applied to model
the electronic noise, and one of its mode is injected to the other port of the BS, the
introduced noise is used to imitate the electronic noise. (b) The modified practical
homodyne detector model. The first BS with the transmittance ηd still imitates the
detection efficiency, while the electronic noise is modelled by another BS with the
transmittance ηe. (c) A variation of the modified practical homodyne detector model.
In this scenario, the incoming signal mode first passes through the BS that represents
the electronic noise, then passes through the BS that represents the detection efficiency.
where the variance of the EPR state is set as 1 + vel
1−ηd
. The equivalence with the PM
model has been analyzed in [27, 29].
We now turn to the modified practical homodyne detector model which is shown
in figure 1(b). In this model, both the detection efficiency and the electronic noise
are imitated by the BSs. The incoming signal M first passes through the BS with
the transmittance of ηd then passes through the BS with the transmittance of ηe. In
the following, we study the relation between the modified practical homodyne detector
model and the conventional practical homodyne detector model while showing that
the modified practical homodyne detector model can describe the practical PM model.
It can be observed that both the conventional and the modified practical homodyne
detector model use the transmittance of the BS to imitate the detection efficiency of
the practical homodyne detector, the conventional model uses an EPR state to imitate
the electronic noise while the modified model uses the transmittance of another BS to
imitate the electronic noise. Thus, we focus on the relation of the electronic noise of
the two models. As is analyzed in [28], the electronic noise ηe in the modified practical
homodyne detector model is defined as
ηe =
A2X2LO
A2X2LO + Vele
, (2)
where the parameters A, XLO and Vele are all corresponding to the practical realizations
in the PM model. The parameter A describes the amplification of the practical
homodyne detector, XLO represents the local oscillator (LO) that interferences with
the quantum signal, and Vele is the variance of the raw electronic noise of the practical
homodyne detector. However, this equation does not directly reflect the relation of the
electronic noise appeared in the conventional practical homodyne detector model and
the modified practical homodyne detector model. The electronic noise vel used in the
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conventional practical homodyne detector model is the value of the raw electronic noise
Vele normalized by the SNU. The SNU in the conventional practical homodyne detector
model is defined as us = A
2X2LO. By dividing A
2X2LO on both the numerator and the
denominator in equation (2), we obtain the relation between ηe and vel
ηe =
1
1 + vel
. (3)
Now, we have obtained the relation of the electronic noise defined by the two
models. The electronic noise from the conventional practical homodyne detector model
can be directly transformed into the modified practical homodyne detector model,
characterized by the transmittance of the BS through equation (3). Yet, the SNU
used in the conventional practical homodyne detector model and that used in the
modified practical homodyne detector model are not the same. In the modified practical
homodyne detector model, the SNU is defined as us
′ = A2X2LO + Vele. In order to
describe the output of the practical homodyne detector after being normalized by the
conventional SNU us, we define a scaling parameter s = us
′/us = 1 + vel that represents
the transformation from the modified SNU us
′ to the conventional SNU us. Now we
consider the output of the modified practical homodyne detector model
V EBN2 = ηeηdVM − ηeηd + 1. (4)
By taking equation (3) into equation (4), then multiplying the scaling parameter s, it
can be easily seen that the outcomes are exactly the same for the two models. So, we
conclude that even though the modified practical homodyne detector model corresponds
to a different SNU us
′, it can still describe the practical homodyne detector that is
normalized by the conventional SNU us. In other words, the two models are essentially
the same given the fact that the output of the practical homodyne detector is normalized
by the same SNU.
It should be pointed out that the modified practical homodyne detector model
can be directly applied as long as the raw data from the PM model is normalized by
the SNU us
′. As can be seen from the EB model, the modified practical homodyne
detector model models the imperfections of the practical homodyne detector separately.
The imperfection of the electronic noise can be properly modelled even if the detection
efficiency is not characterized. When the detection efficiency is not characterized, it is
treated as untrusted loss, while the electronic noise can still be modelled as trusted loss
in the modified practical homodyne detector model.
We can further transform the modified practical homodyne detector model by
swapping the order of the BSs. In this EB model, the incoming quantum signal first
passes through the BS that represents the electronic noise, then passes through the BS
that represents the detection efficiency, as is depicted in figure 1(c). Based on the basic
assumptions made on the practical homodyne detector model, this operation will not
disturb the security of the system. One can easily check that the output variance of
this model is exactly the same as the model in figure 1(b). Thus the EB model after
A modified practical homodyne detector model for CV-QKD 6
the swapping operation can also be applied to model the imperfections of the practical
homodyne detector. This model allows us to model the detection efficiency as trusted
loss individually if the electronic noise is not properly characterized. It means that we
can perform the security analysis without knowing the exact value of the electronic noise,
and maximally retain the advantages of using the practical homodyne detector model.
Moreover, this model offers extra advantages: it will no longer be required to measure
the electronic noise to calibrate the SNU in the corresponding PM model. The accuracy
of the calibrated SNU can be improved, and the spectral efficiency is increased [28].
Therefore, the following analysis will focus on this particular EB model.
3. Detailed security analysis and improvement by the phase-sensitive
amplifier
In this section, we improve the performance of the modified practical homodyne detector
model by using the PSA. In subsection 3.1, the EB model of the modified practical
homodyne detector model with the PSA is proposed and proved to be equivalent with
the practical implementations. Detailed secret key rate analysis is provided in subsection
3.2.
3.1. Security proof of applying the PSA with the modified practical homodyne detector
model
In this subsection we first review the principle of the PSA then apply it to the modified
practical homodyne detector model. The PSA [33,34] that has been extensively studied
can ideally amplify the target canonical quadrature while squeezing the other canonical
quadrature. In this paper, we assume that x quadrature is the target quadrature to
be amplified, the amplification process can be described as xˆ→ √gxˆ; pˆ→√1/gpˆ,
where the parameter g stands for the gain factor, for any value that g ≥ 1, the target
quadrature is amplified. The practical implementations of the PSA may introduce other
noises in the process, yet, these effects are neglected in this paper.
In practical implementations, the PSA is placed before the practical homodyne
detector. Since the PSA is placed right before the practical homodyne detector in the
PM model, in its corresponding EB model, one would expect that the PSA should also
be placed right before practical homodyne detector model, as is shown in figure 2(a).
It is obvious that this EB model is equivalent to the PM model. Yet, the electronic
noise ηe is unknown in the PM model, which means the mode D in the EB model is
also unknown, thus anything before the BS that represents the electronic noise cannot
be directly taken into the secret key rate calculation. Thus, the PSA in this scheme is
not trusted in the security analysis. Following the analysis in section 2, we swap the
order of the PSA and place it in the middle of the two BSs, as is depicted in figure
2(b), where the PSA is placed in the middle of the BS that represents the electronic
noise and the BS that represents the detection efficiency. The feasibility of swapping
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Figure 2. Complete EB model of the modified practical homodyne detector model
with the PSA. Alice generates an EPR state then heterodyne detects one of its mode,
which will project the other mode into a coherent state. Alice sends the coherent
state to Bob. (a) The PSA is placed before the modified practical homodyne detector
model. The incoming signal is first amplified by the PSA then in turn passes through
the BS that represents the electronic noise and the BS that represents the detection
efficiency before being detected by the ideal homodyne detector. (b) The PSA is placed
between the BS that represents the electronic noise and the BS that represents the
detection efficiency. The incoming signal first passes through the BS that represents
the electronic noise then gets amplified by the PSA. Next, the signal passes through the
BS that represents the detection efficiency before being detected by the ideal homodyne
detector.
the order of the PSA and the BS is based on the followings: the swapping operation
will not affect the output of the EB model, which means that equivalence between the
EB model and PM model still holds. The swapping operation is taken place inside
Bob, which means that the operation cannot affect the amount of information that Eve
can obtain. After the swapping operation, the PSA can be considered trusted in the
secret key rate calculation. One may concern whether this EB model is identical to the
practical implementations of the PM model, in the following, we provide the detailed
proof.
We start with the PMmodel, the incoming signal is first compensated using the PSA
then gets detected by the practical homodyne detector. The outputs of the practical
homodyne detector after the PSA are
xPMout = AXLO(
√
ηd
√
gxˆB1 +
√
1− ηdxˆv1) +Xele,
pPMout = AXLO(
√
ηd
√
1/gpˆB1 +
√
1− ηdpˆv1) + Pele,
(5)
where xˆB1 and pˆB1 are the canonical quadratures of mode B1, xˆv1 and pˆv1 are the
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corresponding quadratures of the vacuum, Xele and Pele represent the practical electronic
noise in x quadrature and p quadrature respectively. Both the vacuum and electronic
noise are Gaussian variables with symmetrical behaviours on both quadratures, the
variance of the vacuum is 1, the variance of the raw electronic noise is Vele. The raw
data from the PM model needs to be normalized by the SNU us
′, so that the outputs
after the normalization would be
xPMus′ =
AXLO√
A2X2
LO
+Vele
(
√
ηd
√
gxˆB1 +
√
1− ηdxˆv1) + Xele√
A2X2
LO
+Vele
,
pPMus′ =
AXLO√
A2X2
LO
+Vele
(
√
ηd
√
1/gpˆB1 +
√
1− ηdpˆv1) + Pele√A2X2
LO
+Vele
.
(6)
The Gaussian variables Xele and Pele can be further rewrite as
√
Velexˆv2 and
√
Velepˆv2 ,
where xˆv2 and pˆv2 also represent the canonical quadratures of the vacuum. Then by
substituting AXLO√
A2X2
LO
+Vele
with
√
ηe, as in equation (2), we may write out the final
outputs with regard to the BSs with ηe and ηd
xPMus′ =
√
ηe(
√
ηd
√
gxˆB1 +
√
1− ηdxˆv1) +
√
1− ηexˆv2 ,
pPMus′ =
√
ηe(
√
ηd
√
1/gpˆB1 +
√
1− ηdpˆv1) +
√
1− ηepˆv2 .
(7)
Next, we consider the corresponding EB model. After the swapping operation, the
incoming signal B1 first passes through the BS with the transmittance ηe, then gets
compensated by the PSA, finally passes through the BS that imitates the detection
efficiency ηd. The outputs for x quadrature and p quadrature would be
xEBout =
√
ηe(
√
ηd
√
gxˆB1 +
√
1− ηdxˆv1) +
√
1− ηexˆv2 ,
pEBout =
√
ηe(
√
ηd
√
1/gpˆB1 +
√
1− ηdpˆv1) +
√
1− ηepˆv2 .
(8)
Since the security analysis requires the second order statistics, by calculating the
variance of the output, it can be verified that the outputs of the PM model and the EB
model have the same variance on the detected mode. The equivalence between the PM
model and the EB model still holds. Now, we have proven the feasibility that the EB
model in figure 2(b) can be used to characterize the PM model.
We specifically place the PSA in the middle of the two BSs in the EB model, not
directly place it at the output of the quantum channel like in the corresponding PM
model. This is because the PSA can only compensate the trusted loss in the practical
homodyne detector. Since in this model, only the the detection efficiency is modelled
as trusted loss, the PSA is placed right before the BS that represents the detection
efficiency to compensate the limited detection efficiency.
3.2. Secret key rate analysis
The central idea of conducting security analysis from the EB model is to estimate the
secret key rate of the corresponding PM model. The secret key rate can be calculated
as [35]
R = βIAB − χBE , (9)
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where β is the reconciliation efficiency, IAB is the classical mutual information between
the two legitimate parties while χBE describes the quantum Von Neumann entropy that
Eve gains in the reverse reconciliation scheme.
IAB can be calculated from the variance and conditional variance of Alice and Bob
IAB =
1
2
log
VAM
VAM |B4′
, (10)
where AM represents the mode A after being heterodyne detected, and VAM is its
variance. VAM |B4′ is the conditional variance of A
M after the measurement of mode
B4
′, and it can be calculated as VAM |B4′ = VAM − <A
MB4
′>
2V
B4
′
, where < AMB4
′ > is the
co-variance of AM and B4
′, and all of the variances and co-variances can be found in
the corresponding co-variance matrix γACB4′.
Next, we calculate χBE while providing the detailed derivation of the co-variance
matrix γACB4′ . χBE can be calculated from the following
χBE = S(E)− S(E|xMB4′), (11)
where S(·) stands for the Von Neumann entropy which can be calculated from the
symplectic eigenvalues of the corresponding co-variance matrix. So, χBE can also be
determined from
χBE =
∑3
i=1
G(
λi − 1
2
)−
∑5
i=4
G(
λi − 1
2
). (12)
The function G(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x, and λi are the symplectic eigenvalues
of the corresponding co-variance matrix. In the process of estimating the amount of
entropy that Eve gains, we assume that Eve has unlimited power which gives her the
ability to purify the entire system. Thus, one may write S(E) = S(ADCB4
′). What is
being tricky is that since in the PM model, the electronic noise is not measured, the ηe
and the mode D in the EB model are unknown to us. Therefore, the purification of Eve
should be rewritten as S(E) = S(ACB4
′), which can be deduced from the co-variance
matrix γACB4′. In order to finally obtain the co-variance matrix γACB4′, we start from
the co-variance γAB1 , where B1 represents the quantum signal that just passes through
the quantum channel
γAB1 =
(
V I
√
T (V 2 − 1)σz√
T (V 2 − 1)σz [T (V − 1 + εc) + 1]I
)
, (13)
the parameter V is the variance of the initial EPR state, the channel parameters are the
channel transmittance T and the channel excess noise εc, I is the 2*2 identity matrix
and σz is the Pauli z operator. The mode B1 then passes through the first BS with the
transmittance ηe, which can be derived as
γAB2′D = Y
BS
ηe
∗ [γAB1 ⊗ I] ∗ (Y BSηe )T , (14)
where Y BSηe describes the operation of the BS on mode B1 and the introduced vacuum,
Y BSηe can be derived as: Y
BS
ηe
= I⊗ Yηe . The matrix Yηe represents the transformation
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of the first BS Yηe =
( √
ηeI
√
1− ηeI
−√1− ηeI √ηeI
)
. However, only the co-variance matrix
γAB2′ can be obtained in practice because the mode D is unknown to us. The mode B2
′
is then compensated by the PSA. Since we have assumed the homodyne detector always
measures the x quadrature, the transformation of the PSA on the quadrature level can
be described as
Y PSA =
( √
g 0
0 1/
√
g
)
. (15)
The co-variance matrix γAB3′ can be obtained after mode B2
′ is compensated by the
PSA
γAB3′ = Y
PSA
g ∗ γAB2′ ∗ (Y PSAg )T , (16)
where the transformation matrix Y PSAg can be derived as Y
PSA
g = I⊗ Y PSA. Next, the
mode B3
′ passes through the last BS whose transmittance is the detection efficiency ηd.
The co-variance matrix γAB4′C is calculated as
γAB4′C = Y
BS
ηd
∗ [γAB3′ ⊗ I] ∗ (Y BSηd )T , (17)
where Y BSηd can be derived from Y
BS
ηd
= I⊗ Yηd , it means that the BS is
acting on mode B3
′ and the vacuum. The transformation of the last BS is
Yηd =
( √
ηdI
√
1− ηdI
−√1− ηdI √ηdI.
)
. Finally, we can obtain the co-variance matrix γACB4′
by rearranging the order of the elements in γAB4′C . Thus, the first part of the χBE can
be figured out by calculating the symplectic eigenvalues of γACB4′ . The second term of
χBE is the remaining Von Neumann entropy of Eve given the fact that the mode B4
′ is
being homodyne detected. It can be deduced from the co-variance matrix γ
m
B4
′
AC which
is derived as
γ
m
B4
′
AC = γAC − σAC(XγB4′X)MPσTAC , (18)
X = diag(1, 0, 1, 0) and MP denotes the inverse on the range. The matrix γAC , σAC
and γB4′ are the partitions of the co-variance matrix γACB4′
γACB4′ =
(
γAC σAC
σTAC γB4′
)
. (19)
By calculating the eigenvalues of γ
m
B4
′
AC , and inserting them into equation (12),
we are able to calculate S(E|xM
B4
′). Therefore, the complete secret key rate can be
determined.
4. Simulation results and discussion
Numerous simulation results are provided in this section to demonstrate the effect of
applying the PSA to the modified practical homodyne model. In figure 3, we show the
secret key rate as a function of the transmission distance, the channel efficiency α is
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Figure 3. The secret key rate as a function of the transmittion distance. Simulation
parameters are: channel excess noise εc = 0.01, the variance of the initial EPR state
V = 40, electronic noise ηe = 0.9, detection efficiency ηd = 0.6 except for the black
curve (ηd = 1), and reconciliation efficiency β = 0.956 [36].
0.2 dB · km−1 as standard optical fibers. The green dash-dotted curve is the secret key
rate of gain g = 3 of the PSA while the red dashed curve corresponds to the secret key
rate of gain g = 10 of the PSA. In order to make proper comparisons, we also display
the results of the case where no PSA is considered in the system (blue solid curve) and
the ideal case where the detection efficiency is set to 1 (black dotted curve). It can be
seen that the secret key rate can be improved by the PSA at all transmission distance,
and the higher the gain, the more improvement the secret key rate achieves. The secret
key rate of g = 10 is outperforming than that of g = 3, and it is more approaching to
the ideal detection efficiency case. When the gain of the PSA increases to infinitely
high, the imperfection of the detection efficiency can be fully compensated.
In figure 4, we show the maximal tolerable excess noise as a function of the
transmission distance, given different gain of the PSA g = 3, 10, for the green dash-
dotted curve and the red dashed curve respectively. The curve that corresponds to
the case where no PSA is applied (blue solid curve) and the curve that corresponds
to the ideal detection efficiency (black dotted curve) are also shown. The simulation
results suggest that the improvement in the maximal tolerable excess noise is not so
straightforward. As can be seen, when the transmission distance is less than 5km, the
EB model without the assistance of the PSA can tolerate more excess noise, as the
transmission distance increases, the PSA can help resist more excess noise, and the
higher the gain, the more excess noise the model can tolerate.
Finally, we show how the PSA affects the secret key rate with different modulation
variance VA = V − 1 in figure 5. We provide simulation results for three different
A modified practical homodyne detector model for CV-QKD 12
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Distance (km)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
To
le
ra
bl
e 
ex
ce
ss
 n
oi
se
 (S
NU
) no PSA
ideal detection efficiency
g=3
g=10
Figure 4. The maximal tolerable excess noise (SNU) as a function of the transmission
distance. Simulation parameters are: channel excess noise εc = 0.01, the variance of
the initial EPR state V = 40, electronic noise ηe = 0.9, detection efficiency ηd = 0.6
except for the black curve (ηd = 1), and reconciliation efficiency β = 0.956 [36].
transmission distance of 30, 50, 80 km in green, blue and red curves respectively, and for
different gains of g = 3, 10 in dashed lines, dash-dotted lines, as well as the condition
where no PSA is applied (solid lines) and the ideal condition where the detection
efficiency is set to 1 (dotted lines). It can be seen from the simulation results, the PSA
can be used to improve the secret key rates at all valid modulation variances. When
the gain of the PSA reaches 10, the performance is very close to the ideal detection
efficiency case. In the case where the transmission distance is 50km, we observe that
the PSA can also increase the range of valid modulation variance.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate the modified practical homodyne detector model that can
model the imperfections of the practical homodyne detector separately. It is proved to
be essentially the same with the conventional practical homodyne detector model when
the raw data from the practical implementations is normalized by the same shot-noise
unit. The phase-sensitive amplifier is further applied to improve the performance of the
modified practical homodyne detector model that can individually model the detection
efficiency into trusted loss. Numerous simulation results suggest that the secret key rate
can be improved by the phase-sensitive amplifier. When the gain of the phase-sensitive
amplifier is high, the performance of the modified practical homodyne detector model
can approach to the ideal detection efficiency case. Thus, we conclude that the phase-
sensitive amplifier can be applied to improve the performance of the modified practical
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Figure 5. The secret key rate as a function of the modulation variance (SNU)
VA = V − 1, at different transmission distance. Simulation parameters are: channel
excess noise εc = 0.01, the variance of the initial EPR state V = 40, electronic noise
ηe = 0.9, detection efficiency ηd = 0.6 except for the black curves (ηd = 1), and
reconciliation efficiency β = 0.956 [36].
homodyne detector model.
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